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Why Have Private Saving Rates in the United States and Canada Diverged?
ABSTRACT
Oneof the central questions in macroeconomics formany years has been
whether government policy can affect privatesaving rates, and if so to
what extent and through what channels.The question has remained
controversial because, as with other macroeconomicquestions, experiments
to check divergent hypotheses cannot bedeliberately performed, so
economists must rely upon the often dubious evidence fromthe limited
experiments with which nature and history have endowedus. This paper
discusses the results of an exceptionally good naturalexperiment that has
been provided by Canada and the U.S.over the past thirty-five years.
After moving in tandem for almost 25years, American and Canadian private
saving rates have diverged dramatically over the last decade.The primary
conclusion emerging from our analysis of thisphenomenon is that tax
policies can have a potent impact on private savings behavior.Differences
in tax structures and in the interactions oftaxation and inflation appear
to be important factors explaining the divergentbehavior of the American
and Canadian private savings rates.Recognizing the importance of asset
revaluatjons, caused partially but not entirely by taxeffects, also helps
to explain the different behavior of U.S. andCanadian savings. There may
also be a relationship betweengovernment deficits and the private savings
differential.
Chris Carroll Lawrence H. Summers
18 Bristol Street Department of Economics
Cambridge, MA 02141 Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138mt roduct ion
Macroeconomists are unable to do controlled experiments.Ceteris
paribus is a frequent analytic assumption but a rarely satisfied empirical
condition. The absence of controlled experiments forces macroeconomists to
rely on much less satisfactory statistical analyses of time series data on
economic aggregates.Time series data are less satisfactory than
experimental data because it is difficult to sort out causation from the
observed pattern of correlations.The identification problems posed by
natural experiments are the principal reason why even the most basic
macroeconomic relationships remain controversial after decades of study.
This paper reports on the results of one of the few reasonably well
controlled experiments in the determinants of savings behavior that nature
has provided. After moving in tandem for almost 25 years, American and
Canadian private saving rates have diverged dramatically over the last
decade.While the private saving rate in the United States has fallen
slightly from 8.7% of GNP over the 1971—1975 period to 6.2% over the 1981—
1985 period, the private saving rate in Canada has risen rapidly from 7.8%
to 11.9%.Because the American and Canadian economies have so much in
common geographically and institutionally but have followed very different
fiscal policies during the last decade, recent experience providesan ideal
natural experiment for studying the effects of fiscal policies on savings.
Our approach is more agnostic than the currently fashionable one of
fitting complex structural models.This reflects our conviction that
movements in private saving rates are determined by processes too complex
to represent by any sort of formulation embodying the preferences and
budget constraint facing a "representative consumer." Rather than trying2
topostulate a single "correct" model of savings behavior which is
applicable to both the U.S. and Canada, instead we simply relate
differences in private saving rates to a variety of factors that seem
plausibly related to savings behavior.The hope is that convincing
patterns will emerge, though we recognize that our approach cannot provide
reliable quantitative estimates of the effects of plausible policy changes
on the saving rate.In light of the rather mixed conclusions of studies
examining consumption behavior through the prism of optimizing models,
experimenting with a more loosely structured approach seems worthwhile.
The primary conclusion emerging from our analysis is that tax policies
can have a potent impact on private savings behavior. Differences in tax
structures and in the interactions of taxation and inflation appear to be
important factors explaining the divergent behavior of the American and
Canadian private saving rates.Recognizing the importance of asset
revaluations, caused partially but not entirely by tax effects, also helps
to explain the different behavior of U.S. and Canadian savings. There may
also be a relationship between government deficits and the private savings
differential.
The paper is organized as follows.Section I documents the very
different behavior of the U.S. and Canadian saving rates over the last 10
years.We show that the observed patterns are robust with respect to
measurement adjustments involving inflation accounting, and we demonstrate
that most of the changes in relative U.S. and Canadian private saving rates
can be attributed to changes in the Canadian personal saving rate. Section
II notes the broad similarity in the macroeconomic environment in the two
countries and then uses an econometric model to examine the extent to whichdifferences in cyclical conditions, interestrates, and inflation can
account for movements in the two countries' relative savingrates. It
finds that relatively little of the variation in savingrates can be traced
to differences in macroeconomic conditions.
Section III examines the impact of structural and institutional
differences between the two countries on their respectiveprivate saving
rates. We show that the divergence in U.S. and Canadian privatesaving
rates coincides quite closely with the introduction ofmajor savings
incentives in Canada in the early 1970s. There is alsosome evidence that
it may be associated with large increases in Canadiangovernment deficits
that has taken place in recent years. Finally, we examine therole of
changes in wealth caused by capital gains and losses in determining private
saving rates. We adduce evidence suggesting that thenon—deductibility of
consumer interest payments in Canada in conjunction with rising nominal
interest rates contributed to the relative increase in itsprivate saving
rate.
Section IV attempts to determine the relative importanceof the factors
examined in Section III by placing them in themacroeconomic framework
developed in Section II. Section V concludes.
I. Documenting Diverging Saving Rates
The divergence between the behavior of the Canadian andAmerican
private saving rates which provides the motivation for thispaper is
illustrated in Chart #la (Tables corresponding to all thecharts can be
found either in the body of the text or in theappendix) While the two
saving rates moved in parallel prior to 1971, beginning at aboutthat time
saving behavior in the two countries diverged sharply. Canadiansaving
34
increased rapidly from a relatively constant level of about 7% of GNP to an
unprecedented 10.5% in 1975 and continued to increase to about 12% in the
mid 1980s, while the U.S. rate declined slightly over the entire period.
The surge in Canadian saving in the early 1970s appears in retrospect to
have been the beginning of a permanent and fundamental difference between
the U.S. and Canadian economies.1
Charts #lb and #lc examine differences in the behavior of the two
components of private saving —personaland corporate saving.It is
apparent that most of the reason for the relative increase in Canadian
private saving is the increase in the Canadian personal saving rate. The
Canadian personal saving rate averaged 3.3% of GNP for the period 1957 to
1971, and exhibited relatively little variance around this level.By
contrast, from 1972 to 1985 the average level was 7.6% of GNP, and saving
was less than 7% of GNP in only two years after 1974.It rose as high as
10.9% in 1982. Patterns of corporate saving behavior are similar in the
two countries, showing mild declines reflecting reduced profitability after
1975 in general and during the sharp 1982 recession in particular (Chart
#lc) . Theroughly similar behavior of corporate saving in the two
countries suggests that the U.S.—Canadian comparison cannot enlighten
debates about the extent to which individuals "pierce the corporate veil"
in making their saving decisions. This also suggests that we should focus
on the determinants of personal savings in explaining the differing
American and Canadian experiences.
A number of authors, notably Jump (1980), have stressed the distortion
We focus here on private saving rates because they seem to us themost natural
object for the application of theory. Others, to whom the Ricardian equivalence
proposition seems plausible on a priorigrounds,would work with national saving















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































in measured private saving rates created by the effects of inflation. The
main argument is that measures of saving are distorted by their treatment
of the inflationary component of interest rates as income rather than
return of principal.Chart #ld depicts movements in an estimate of
inflation—adjusted private saving for both the U.S. and Canadian economies.
In brief, the inflation-adjusted saving rate is arrived at by deducting
from saving the erosion in the value of money-denominated assets due to
inflation.2 The divergence in saving rates for the two countries remains
evident even after the inflation adjustment.
A fair conclusion is that the divergent behavior of American and
Canadian private saving behavior is a phenomenon requiring explanation. We
consider possible explanations below.
II.Macroeconomic Variables and the Saving Rate
Macroeconomic fluctuations are often thought to affect personal saving
through a variety of mechanisms usually derived explicitly or implicitly
from a life cycle or permanent income model of consumer behavior. Cyclical
fluctuations also influence corporate profits and the therefore corporate
savings. While macroeconomic conditions in the U.S. and Canada are highly
correlated (which is why we choose to compare U.S. and Canadian saving
rates), it is possible that differences in performance such as those
documented by Ashenfelter and Card (1986) may account for some of the
divergence in saving rates.In order to examine this possibility we ran a
battery of regressions relating differences in contemporaneous and lagged
values of the rate of inflation, the rate of growth of personal disposable
2 When definitions are changed to correspond with those in Jump (1980) our
estimates for the inflation—adjusted U.S. personal saving rate correspond closely
with Jump's, although we used a simplified version of his procedure. This gives us
confidence in our Canadian results as well, since both inflation rates and the
level of financial assets in the U.S. and Canada are similar.7
income, the GNP gap, the unemployment rate, and the short term interest
rate to differences in personal and total privatesaving.All of the
equations reported in this paper are estimated usingordinary least
squares. Despite substantial positive serial correlation in the residuals,
we did not make a serial correlation correction because
quasi—differericing
would raise the sensitivity of the results to shortrun rather than long
run considerations. Given that our right hand side variablesare measured
imperfectly, it would also exacerbate errors in variablesproblems. The
reported standard errors are corrected for the effects of serial
correlation assuming that the OLS residuals follow an AR(1)process. The
general conclusion from the regression results reported in Table #1 is that
macroeconomic variables cannot explain the bulk of the relativemovements
in U.S. and Canadian saving rates, We now examinethe justifications and
results for each of the individual variables included in theregressions,
beginning with the inflation rate.
Had there been persistent and significant differences inU.S. and
Canadian inflation in recent years it might have beenplausible to
attribute the savings divergence at least partially tomechanisms like
those described by Jump (1980), Cawdery and Prefontairie(1982), and others
in recent papers. Casual examination of the datamakes it clear, however,
that inflation differences have been small andunsystematic both
historically and recently.It is no surprise, therefore, that in our
regressions coefficients on the differential between the two national
inflation rates were virtually never statisticallysignificant, either in
the reported regressions or in a large body ofunreported ones. Similar
results are obtained from equations (not shown)using inflation—adjustedOstle *:: :se Private Savino Rate and Macroeconomic Variables
:eenben: va:iabe inall, regressionsis the difference between U.S. and Canadian private saving rates
.neasrec as a fraction of C-NP)
211reqresscns over theperiod 1961—1985
:-rrecten:—statlstics in rarentheses -
tispcsable Unemploy-




































saving rates as the dependent variable.
If inflation does not seem to have been an important contributor, what
about cyclical variables? The life cycle theory and thepermanent income
hypothesis both indicate that unexpectedly fast disposable income growth
should be associated with high saving, and low saving shouldaccompany low
growth. Canada experienced a somewhat faster growth in disposable income
than did the U.S. in the l97Os, but the recession in the early eighties
reduced disposable income in Canada more than in the U.S., so the growth
patterns of the economies have been less similar than their inflation
experiences.Still, regressions attempting to explain the savings
differences by the differences in disposable income growth and itslagged
values were not successful, with coefficients remaining near zero whether
the private saving rate (Table #1) or the personal saving ratewas the
dependent variable, and whether or not lagged values were included in the
regressions. In a similar vein, the GNP gap was also tested as a predictor
of saving rates; it too was found to be insignificant in bothcurrent and
lagged formulations.
An alternative indicator of the level of economic distress inan
economy, and therefore perhaps of the need for cyclical saving, is the
unemployment rate. A temporarily high unemployment rate might be expected
to lead to a temporarily low private saving rate as unemployed individuals
drew down their savings, while an unusually low rate of unemploymentmight
be associated with high savings for life cycle reasons. Theunemployment
rate differential proved to be the only macroeconomic variable which was
statistically significant in our regressions —highlyso, in fact, with
R2's for associated regressionsranging up to 50% -butthe coefficients on10
the unemployment rate were positive rather than the expected negative.
Increased relative unemployment appears to be associated with increased
saving.
An explanation for this behavior consistent with received theory holds
that the sharp increase in Canadian saving which coincided with an increase
in Canada's relative unemployment rate was the result of a perception by
Canadians that their economy had become a significantly more risky working
environment, necessitating a higher rate of precautionary savings.This
hypothesis is loosely supported by polls which indicate a large drop in the
confidence of Canadians in their economy in the late seventies3 and by
the observation that the unemployment differential is statistically
insignificant when only data for the period prior to 1976 are studied.
Finally, we examine the impact of differences in interest rates on
differences in saving rates.Given the other variables included in the
equations, it is probably appropriate to think of differences in nominal
rates as largely reflecting differences in real interest rates.While
theory does not permit an unambiguous judgement about the effects of
changes in interest rates on saving rates, Summers (1981, 1986) argues that
the likely effect of an increase in interest rates is an increase in
private savings.The coefficients on the interest rate variable are in
fact positive and significant in all Table #1 regressions, but they explain
only a relatively small fraction of the saving behavior observed.
In sum, differences in macroeconomic conditions in the U.S. and Canada
do not explain the very different behavior of private savings in the two
countries.This conclusion should not be surprising given the broad
similarity in the shocks experienced by the two countries and the magnitude
-PersonalSavings in Canada,p.32.of the divergence in saving rates.In the next section we turn to possible
institutional explanations.
III.Explaining the Divergence
If the recent macroeconomic experiences in Canada and the U.S. are not
sufficient to account for the remarkable divergence in national accounts
basis private saving rates, a natural supposition might be that fiscal
policy differences, either in the tax structures of the two countries or in
the government deficits, may provide the explanation.A focus on such
differences as the most profitable field to explore in U.S./Canadian
comparisons was suggested by Alan Blinder (1982), who wrote that
"Comparisons between Canada and the United States come about as close to a
controlled experiment as economists are ever likely to get.The two
countries are similar in so many ways that we can feel almost justified in
attributing whatever difference we observe to legal—institutional
differences." Of the many differences in the U.S. and Canadian fiscal
policy, three in particular might be expected to have had an especially
strong impact on the personal saving rate recently: differences in the
sheltered savings opportunities provided by the tax codes, differences in
the level of the government deficit/surplus, and the differing status of
deductibility of consumer and mortgage interest payments.4 Another
approach to the whole question is to consider a different definition of
saving, which unlike the National Income Accounts (NIA) measure
incorporates capital gains and losses, to determine whether it might be a
better object for study than the NIA measure, or might help to explain
We did investigate the consequences of several other fiscal policy differences in
the two countries, including differences in the level of income and capital gains
taxes, but we have concluded that none of these topics was as important as those we
are examining in detail. For more information on this subject see Carroll (1986)12
trends in NIA saving.We treat these issues in three parts: first a
discussion of sheltered savings, next a discussion of deficits, and finally
a discussion of trends in capital gains and personal wealth which contains
an analysis of the impact of tax differences in the treatment of
liabilities.
Sheltered Savings
Canada has a complex system of government—registered private retirement
income and pension plans which was instituted in 1957 and expanded
significantly during the early seventies. Employer—sponsored Registered
Pension Plans (RPP's) and individual Registered Retirement Savings Plans
(RRSP's) are the two largest programs in the system, and most of the
smaller plans are minor variants on the structure of the RPP/RRSP programs.
The principal feature of the system is that the sum of an individual's tax
sheltered contributions and his employer's contributions on his behalf can
be at most $3500 a year. Originally the maximum contribution was $1500,
but changes to the tax laws in 1972, 1974, and 1976 expanded the limits and
allowed certain new types of contributions.5In addition a $1000
deduction for investment income was introduced in 1974. This permitted a
considerable portion of total savings to be effectively sheltered, since
tax deductibility of contributions is equivalent to tax deductibility of
earnings.G.V. Jump (1982), however, has calculated that in 1979 two
thirds of all investment income was earned by taxpayers with incomes of
For more derailed information on the chronology and nature of changes in the
Canadian tax code see Carroll (1986) or Janet Jarrett's Personal Savings in Canada,
p. 61, text andfootnote12. A further sheltered saving program, the Registered
HomeOwnership Savings Plan (PHOSP) was created in 1974 but is now being phased
out. For simplicity, total individual sheltered saving in Canada will henceforth
be referred to as RRSPsaving; likewise the sum of IRA andKeogh contributions will
becalled IRA saving.
It is interesting to note that at the time of this writing the Canadian Parliament
is debating a furtherexpansion of the RASPprogram as a response to the
considerable success of the program so far.13
more than $20,000, while the average level of investment income for
taxpayers in this bracket was $3624, far above the $1000 maximum deductible
amount, leading Jump to conclude that most personal investment is not
sheltered at the margin. Although Jump's point is welltaken, it should
also be noted that persistently over 70% of all taxablereturns claimed
some deduction (most of which must have been less than the $1000maximum),
and between 25% and 30% of total reported investment incomeduring the mid
to late seventies was deducted from taxable income.6 Even ifwe assume
that two thirds of these deductions were by people with investment income
in excess of the $1000 limit (and therefore unsheltered at themargin),
this still leaves perhaps 10% of ordinary (non-RRSP) investmentwhich is
sheltered at the margin. Making the assumption that 10% of investment
income (in addition to that sheltered by RRSP's) was shelteredby this tax
rule would somewhat strengthen the results of the regressions andother
analysis that follows.
In the U.S. sheltered savings opportunities have beenmore limited.
Individual Retirement Accounts, available to alltaxpayers, and Keogh
plans, limited to the self-employed, are the chiefprograms which allow
discretionary sheltered saving.Prior to the Economic Recovery Tax Act
(ERTA) of 1981 only a small percentage of taxpayerswere eligible to
participate in these plans, but the ERTA expanded IRA eligibility to all
taxpayers and increased the maximum deductible contribution to $2000;newly
legislated tax policies in the U.S. call for reducing thescope of the IRA
program.
Table #2 presents nominal and real rates of returnon three month T-
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































billsof the U.S. and Canadian governments (which are intended to represent
a "market" pre—tax rate of return available to consumer)7 and estimates
of after—tax rates of return on unsheltered investment in T—bills.8
According to our calculations, the after—tax real rate of return on
unsheltered financial investment was negative during almost the entire
decade of the 1970's in both countries, although in the late seventies the
rate of return was much higher in Canada than in the U.S.Chart #2
presents the differential between the rate of return available on sheltered
and on unsheltered investment in both countries; it is clear from this
chart that the incentives to save in sheltered as opposed to unsheltered
forms were extremely powerful in both countries, but even stronger in
Canada than in the U.S.
Table #3 presents data on levels of contributions to the RRSP and IRA
programs. Between 1971 and 1976, i.e. from the year before the expansion
in RRSP eligibility to the year of the last major change in the system, the
sum of contributions to RRSP's and our estimate of income earned within
RRSP's (see Table #3 for details) rose as a percentage of Canadian
disposable income from around .5% to 2.6%; by 1981 the figure had reached
3.4%. The expansions of RRSP contributions coincide fairly closely with
the beginnings of the rise in the Canadian personal saving rate from below
6.5% of disposable income before 1972 to around 10% in 1976—1978, and
In the United States the T-bill rate is not necessarily a good indicator of the
pre—tax rate of return on financial saving during much of the period because the
Federal Reserves Regulation Q kept interest rates on many forms of personal saving
artificially low after 1973. According to U.S. Flow of Funds statistics, more than
half of direct personal holdings of interest—bearing assets in the seventies and
eariy eighties were in "tire and savings deposits, "andsubject to the Regulation Q
interest rate ceilings.
8 The marginal rate of return on taxable (unsheltered) savings is measured by
assuming that the marginal rate of taxation is 30%, and so that the after—tax
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higherstill to 12-13% by the early eighties.
A closer examination of patterns and levels of contribution to RRSPs,
however, indicates that even under generous assumptions the direct effects
of RRSPs can account for only a part of the increase in Canadian saving.
If the entire increase in RRSP contributions is considered to Constitute
new saving (as opposed to a transfer of saving from other forms into RRSP
accounts) the RRSP program can account for at most half of the overall 6%
rise in the personal saving rate out of disposable income. Research has
not determined definitively the proportion of RRSP saving which is "new"
saving which would not have been undertaken had the RRSP program not
existed, but it seems certain that the figure should be substantially less
than 100%. If the relatively generous assumption is made that 2/3 of RRSP
saving would not have been done had there been no RRSP program, then RRSP's
can directly account for at most a third of the increase in Canadian
personal saving.
However, at least two considerations can be invoked to justify
attributing more importance to RRSPTS. First, George Katona (1964) and
Philip Cagan (1965) have, under different guises, proposed a "recognition
effect" hypothesis, whereby consumers are made more aware of the benefits
of saving and as a result undertake to save more. The theory would apply
to Canada to the extent that the availability of RRSP's shifted the tastes
of Canadians to make saving more, and consumption less, attractive. This
might have been accomplished by the advertising campaigns mounted by many
banks for consumers' RRSP accounts.9The second point which suggests
In a recent research trip to Ottawa, one of the authors observed promotional
posters, signs, and literature for RRSP saving schemes in prominent positions in
virtually every downtown bank. One particularly manipulative, but probably
effective, poster featured an impoverished, homeless old woman with a caption which
suggested that hers was the fate awaiting anyone unwise enough not to take
advantage of the bank's RRSP program.20
that RRSP saving may have been more important than would appear at first
blush is that the increase in inflation—adjusted RRSP savings is greater
than the increase in the inflation-adjusted Canadian saving rate. In this
sense RRSPs appear very important.1°
IRA and Keogh saving in the United States has been less important than
RRSP saving in Canada.Steven Venti and David Wise (1985) in the only
thorough econometric evaluation of the IRA program conclude that most IRA
contributions represent new savings.Summers (1986) reaches a similar
conclusion on the basis of other more qualitative evidence on the frequency
with which individuals make contributions at the last possible moment and
the reported wealth holdings of IRA contributors. Many other authorities,
pointing to the decline in the personal saving rate that has taken place in
recent years, believe that IRAs have had little effect. It should be noted
however that the inflation adjusted private saving rate in the U.S. has
actually increased since the expansion of IRAs in 1981 (Chart #ld)
A final form of sheltered saving which was available in both countries
was employer-sponsored pension saving.In both countries pension saving
outstripped all other categories of financial saving, and in both countries
the real value of pension wealth virtually doubled between 1973 and 1983.
In the U.S., where pension saving was the only form of sheltered saving
widely available before 1982, pension wealth was also the only form of
It should be noted that the comparison of inflation-adjusted RRSP saving with
inflation—adjusted saving inotherfinancial assets could be misleading, in that
during the period under study RRSP assets were much smaller in relation to RRSP
saving (accumulated assets were small because the RRSP program was relatively new)
than other financial assets inrelationto other financial saving. Small assets
lead to a small inflation—erosion adjustment to saving, so the fact that the
increase in inflation—adjusted RRSP saving rate is high in comparison with the
increase in inflation—adjusted total saving is not necessarily so striking as it
may seem.21
financial wealth to grow rapidly.However, because the experiences in
pension saving were broadly similar in the two countries, because
definition and data differences make direct comparison difficult, and
because decisions about contributions to employer-sponsored pension
programs are only indirectly under the control of individuals, we chose to
concentrate most of our attention on RRSP and IRA/Keogh saving differences
rather than on pensions.
Fiscal Policy
Macroeconomic theory leads us to believe that the fiscal stance of the
government may have an impact on the personal saving rate.In its most
extreme form, the Ricardian Equivalence Proposition of Robert Barro (1974)
states that the level of government borrowing should not affect a
consumer's long—run consumption plans so long as it is not associated with
changes in government spending patterns, since he realizes that current
government borrowing must be paid for with higher taxes in the future.
This proposition holds that government borrowing will not affect the
interest rate and that changes in the government borrowing rate will be
offset one for one by changes in the private saving rate.
Comparing Chart #la with Chart #3, we see that in Canada the initial
surge in private saving in the early seventies was followed, in the early
eighties, by massive government budget deficits. Given the volatility of
each of the subcomponents of national saving in Canada (Charts #la-c, #3),
the behavior of the Canadian national saving rate depicted in Chart #4 has
been remarkably stable during the post-77 period. It is very striking that
over the entire 1957-1985 period U.S. and Canadian overall national saving
rates have moved in parallel despite quite different movements in the
individual components of national savings.22
U.S. data, however, does not conform with Ricardian equivalence in any
period covered by our data (See the paper by Poterba and Summers in this
issue) .Ratherthan rising as in Canada, the private saving rate in the
U.S. declined somewhat as the government deficit mushroomed to
unprecedented proportions in the early eighties. In addition, in the early
and middle sixties when the government was running a substantial structural
surplus there is little sign of an abnormally low personal saving rate.
PersonalAssets, Capital Gains, and Saving
Tothis point we have concentrated our analysis on the measures of
saving specified in the National Income Accounts of the U.S. and Canada,
but these definitions may not be ideal measures of personal saving as
economists should define it.This is primarily because measured income
does not include capital gains and losses on existing assets. Saving may
alternatively be defined not as the fraction of the current income stream
unspent but rather as the change in net wealth from period to period.11
Information on this measure of savings may be found in the National Balance
Sheets (NBS) of the U.S. and Canada, which attempt to measure the levels of
wealth and debt in all sectors of the economy. These data reveal wealth
saving patterns which have diverged significantly from national accounts
saving patterns in several ways. In fact, the rate of growth in the real
value of personal wealth in Canada over the 1976-1985 period averaged only
2.7% annually -belowtheaverage rate of 4.6% during the period 1966-
1975.Over the same period in the U.S. net wealth saving, at 2.3%, was
actually above its average rate of growth in the previous decade, 1.75
It is not obvious that capital gains should be included in national savings.
Treating them as savings would require regarding them as investment arid part of N?
if nationai accounts consistency were to be maIntaIned.23
(Table #4) •12 The purpose of this section is to assess the extent to
which these differing trends in wealth saving can be attributed to the
differing tax and market incentives facing consumers in the two countries,
and to discuss the relationships between wealth saving and NIA basis
saving.
Perhaps the area where the institutional systems in Canada and the U_s.
have differed most is in the relative incentives they provide to consumer
borrowing. The most important difference has been in the tax deductibility
of consumer interest provided by the U.S., but not the Canadian, tax code.
Regulatory and other public agencies have also worked to reduce mortgage
interest rates in the u.s)-3 Consequently real after-tax interest rates
on consumer borrowing in the U.S. have historically been lower than in
Canada, although the difference in after-tax mortgage interest rates
remained relatively constant in the 2.5-3% range until about 1976 (Table
#2)
In the late seventies, however, institutional rigidities in the U.S.
prevented the nominal interest rate from rising fully as inflation
accelerated, and this fact combined with tax deductibility (which becomes
more valuable as inflation increases) to produce strongly negative real
after—taxinterest rates. In Canada, on the other hand, the nominal rate
rose rapidly as inflation accelerated, and there was no inflation-induced
taxdeductibility boon. These forces widened the gap between the two real
12
is important to recall here that no effort has been made by U.S. and Canadian
statistical agencies to ensure that their measures of levels of wealth and wealth
saving are compatible, so within—country comparisons, either historical comparisons
or cross—sectional statistics, are likely to be more reliable than intercountry
comparisons.
13 See the Treasury Departmentpublication in the References Section. Also see


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































after—taxrates to fully 8% by 1981 (see Table #2forallthesedata)
Blinder (1982) has suggested that the encouragement given to borrowing
by the U.S. tax code may have been one of the principal reasons for low
U.S. and high Canadian saving rates since the mid—seventies.It is
certainly true that following the extraordinary reduction in the relative
cost of borrowing (roughly post-1976) U.S. household liabilities
(especially mortgage liabilities) grew much faster in comparison with
Canadian liabilities than they had done previously (Chart #5) .To
illustrate, in the period 1970—76 the annual increase in household
liabilities averaged 10.6% of disposable income in Canada and only 6.1% in
the U.S.; in the period 1977-85 the debt formation figure fell by 3.8% of
disposable income in Canada, to 6.8%, and rose by 2.3% in the U.S., to 8.4%
(Table II) 14
An increase in liabilities is usually used to finance the purchase of
tangible assets, particularly housing and real estate, so we should expect
movements in the tangible wealth component of personal wealth to offset the
changes in liabilities; in fact, the National Income Accounts assume that
any increase in liabilities is used to purchase an equal value of other
assets and therefore does not change net personal wealth at all. There do
indeed appear to be clear links between liabilities and other assets. The
late-seventies growth in U.S. liabilities which accompanied that period's
record-low after—tax interest rates was contemporaneous with a surge in
U.S. housing/real estate wealth and housing construction, while an
acceleration of the rate of new debt formation in Canada during the early
Recall again that intercountry comparisons are somewhat more dubious than within—
country historical comparisons because of uncertainties about measurement
differences in the u.s. and Canada; thus it is not clear how significant it is that
the Canadian rate of debt formation was generally somewhat higher than the U.S.
rate.Differential in Growth in Nominal Liabilitiesas a Percentage
of Personal Disposable Income
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26seventies (also a record—low real interest rate period) was also
accompanied by a construction boom and a rapid accumulation of tangible
assets (Table #11)
There are also links more subtle than that implied by the NIA one-for—
one liabilities—for—wealth tradeoff assumption.Probably the most
important has to do with the fact that housing and real estate are
inelastically supplied in the short run, so that any rapid increase in
demand should produce a rapid run-up in prices, which would then decline
slowly back into equilibrium. Chart #6 presents a comparison of the annual
increase in the real market price of housing in the U.S. and Canada (see
Table #5 for the data and for a description of sources).Twoextraordinary
facts emerge from the chart.The first is that the early part of the
seventies witnessed an extremely rapid increase in prices of housing in
Canada, coinciding closely with the above-mentioned acceleration in
liabilities. The corresponding revaluation of housing wealth produced a
surge in net wealth saving in Canada; according to the NBS the real value
of personal holdings of housing and land increased by 65% between 1970 and
1976, and new construction, although high, can only account for a small
portion of this. After 1975, however, Canadian housing price increases
generally failed even to keep up with inflation, causing a downward
revaluation of assets.In the U.S., on the other hand, housing prices in
the early seventies barely outpaced inflation, and tangible wealth growth
was slow, but in the middle and later seventies (when the tax incentives to
liabiliteswere so strongand borrowing accelerated) they grew rapidly, as
didtangiblewealth. Prices (and tangible wealth) fell in both countries
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2930
much more severe, possibly because the Canadians were not eligible for the
generous tax incentives which allowed U.S. consumers to maintain relatively
high mortgage borrowing during this period.
The final difference in the wealth saving experiences of the U.S. and
Canada is that during the recession of the early eighties Canadians
experienced considerably larger real capital losses across the board,
partly because the Canadian recession was more severe than that in the U.S.
and partly because inflation persisted somewhat longer in Canada. Under
the hypothesis that individuals increase saving to compensate for capital
losses and decrease saving in response to capital gains (an implication of
the life cycle and permanent income hypothesis views of saving
determination; see Friend and Lieberman (1975) for a statement and
empirical tests), there should be a negative relationship between the level
of personal wealth and the private saving rate.It is true that the
sustained increase in Canadian NIA saving coincided with the slowdown in
the growth in Canadian wealth, and that Canadian saving was highest in the
early eighties when losses were greatest. By contrast, in the U.S. where
wealth revaluation experiences were more favorable after 1976, the national
accounts basis saving rate did not grow.
IV.,Econometric Analysis
One problem with the preceding analysis is that, while examining
individual questions in detail, it fails to provide a framework for
assessing the overall importance of the different factors in influencing
the saving rate. We address this issue now by considering three measures
of such differences in the context of the regressions reported in Section
II. We have added four independent variables to the regressions: the level
of sheltered saving as a fraction of disposable income, the weighted31
average real after—tax rate of return on financial assets, the overall
government deficit/surplus, and the ratio of personal wealth to GNP.
(Results are reported in Table #6)
Sheltered Savings
In essentially all of our regression specifications the coefficient for
the level of sheltered savings was significantly positive, with
coefficients between —1 and —2 and corrected t statistics which were
significant at the 5% level. A literal interpretation of this result would
be that an increase in sheltered savings was associated with a 150%
increase in private savings, a result which is difficult to explain except
on the basis of the Cagan-Katona recognition effect hypothesis. From a
mechanical standpoint, the reason for this result is that the period of
high sheltered saving in Canada was also the period of higher total private
saving, and the increase in total saving was even larger than that in
sheltered saving.It should be noted that when similar regressions were
run for the countries individually, the sheltered saving coefficient in the
u.s. was not significant, while that in Canada was highly significant.
An alternative variable variable intended to capture the effect of
sheltered savings programs is the weighted average interest rate, which
attempts to measure the average rate of return on all personal saving by
combining the rate on sheltered and on unsheltered assets using appropriate
•weights corresponding to the relative sizes of the two types of saving.
This variable was usually estimated with coefficients between .6 and .9,
indicating that a 1% increase in the weighted interest rate would elicit an
increase in saving of .6 to .9% of C-NP.
The budget deficit variable received coefficients ranging between -.9and —1.1, with high t—statistics (Table #6). Again interpreting literally,
this would mean that an increase in government dissaving is associated with
a roughly matching increase in private saving -theresult predicted by
Ricardian equivalence. Once again, however, caution should be exercised in
interpreting this result, since it is due entirely to the fact that the
period of highest saving in Canada, roughly post 1976, was also the period
of the escalating Canadian government deficit. Individual country
regressions show that essentially the whole significance of the
coefficients on government deficit differentials is due to the trends in
Canada after 1976, while the U.S. results are insignificant for all
periods.
The final variable included in the regressions was the level of
personal wealth as a fraction of disposable income, which was intended to
test whether movements in national accounts basis saving might reasonably
be interpreted as resulting from efforts by consumers to maintain their
level of real wealth in the face of fluctuations in asset values due to
revaluations of their asset portfolios. The coefficient was of the correct
sign (negative) and was very strongly significant in all of the
specifications of the model, and (unlike most of the other significant
variables) was even significant in most specifications which did not
include data after 1977. This suggests that both independent movements in
asset values and the housing market booms which we attributed partially to
low after-tax rates of interest may have affected saving.
V. Conclusion
This paper has identified three important factors contributing to the
large divergence between the private saving rate in the U.S. and Canada.
32They are the greater tax incentives for financial savings in Canada, the
greater tax disincentives for borrowing to purchase tangible assets in
Canada, and the larger budget deficits recently experienced in Canada. At
this point it is difficult to gauge their relative importance sincethe
empirical results are driven largely by the experience of the late 1970s
and the 1980s.But the Canadian experience does serve to call into
question the widely accepted presumption that there is little that public
policy can do to affect private saving rates.
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